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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past decade, the United States' banking community
has explored investment opportunities in Brazil and other emerging
markets with increasing frequency.' Brazil, like China, India,
Indonesia, and Russia, has made a "transition from 'developing
country' to an 'emerging capital market,' 2  offering greater
opportunities for foreign investment. An emerging market is one in
need of external financing to fund its rapid growth and development. 3
Furthermore, it provides a large population and ready market for
manufactured goods and technology. 4 Within the global economy,
emerging markets provide an open door for businesses to establish
long-lasting relationships that will grow as the country develops and
prospers.
Emerging markets, such as Brazil, provide new business
opportunities for banks in two different ways. First, these markets
need commercial banks to provide traditional banking services and to
finance industrial development. 5  In Brazil, privatization of state-
owned industries has created opportunities for banks to arrange loans
to finance the privatization effort.6  In addition to earning interest,
1. See Rumu Sarkar, The Legal Implications of Financial Sector Reform in Emerging
Capital Markets, 13 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 705, 706-07 (1998); James R. Kraus, Chase
Buys an Investment Operation in Brazil, AM. BANKER, Jan. 8, 1999, at 1 (discussing
Chase Manhattan Corp. purchase of a majority share in a Brazilian investment bank,
Banco Patrimonio de Investimento SA); James R. Kraus, After Long Dry Spell, U.S.
Banks on Latin American Acquisition Spree, AM. BANKER, Nov. 21, 1997, at 4 (stating
that several U.S. banks are expanding their operations in Brazil, including American
Express Bank, NationsBank, Wachovia, and BankBoston).
2. See Sarkar, supra note 1, at 705-06.
3. See International Bank Lending: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Fin.
Inst. Supervision, Regulation, and Ins., Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong. 272 (1983) [hereinafter Conover Statement] (statement of C.T. Conover,
Comptroller of the Currency).
4. See id. at 274.
5. See id. at 274-75.
6. See David Swafford, Twin Billions, LATINFINANCE, June 1998, at 84, available in
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banks earn high fees for taking part in such loan arrangements. 7
Second, since United States companies are increasingly taking their
business to Brazil, 8 banks are moving to the Latin American nation to
better serve their customers' needs. 9 By opening branches abroad,
banks are helping to facilitate the growth of their customers in
emerging markets.
Emerging markets have a tendency to be unstable in their
growth, however, due to weak currencies and heavy debt burdens. In
the fall of 1998, the economic turmoil in Russia and Asia significantly
impacted the Brazilian economy and foreign investors' interest in the
area. 1 The beginning of 1999 marked even more trouble for the
Brazilian economy when market pressures forced the government to
end its four-year experiment with an anti-inflation program." Section
II of this Note will explore the reasons that United States businesses,
particularly North Carolina-based banks, have been interested in
Brazil, 2 and will examine the depth of their involvement in Brazil.' 3
Section III will review the recent tumultuous financial problems in
Brazil, brought on by the contagion in global financial markets.'
4
Section IV will suggest reasons why the global financial community
should continue to support Brazil through such efforts as the proposed
International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue plan.' 5 Section V of this
LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File. For example, NationsBank has acted as financier
and arranger of loans in Brazil's privatization process. See id.
7. See Conover Statement, supra note 3, at 275.
8. See Treasury Will Not Hold Tax Treaty Talks with Brazil Until Assurances are
Met, BNA INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BNAIBF File. This article recounts North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms' attempt to
persuade Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin to establish a tax treaty with Brazil in order to
serve IBM's operations in Brazil more effectively. See id; James R. Kraus, Chase Buys
an Investment Operation in Brazil, AM. BANKER, Jan. 8, 1999, at 4 (quoting the president
of a Brazilian consulting firm as saying that "foreign banks are going after Brazilian
investment banks in order to build a position for future business.").
9. See James R. Kraus, Wachovia, Buying Brazil Bank, Concedes International
Service is a Must, AM. BANKER, Jan. 9, 1997, at 8. Hugh Durden, executive vice-
president of Wachovia Corporate Services Inc., stated that "what's very clear is that
international capabilities and global services will be a key determinant of a bank's ability
to maintain and develop large corporate relationships." Id.
10. See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 17-51 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 52-81 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 82-122 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 123-60 and accompanying text.
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Note will survey the role of federal agencies and legislation in the
regulation of international banking activities. 16
II. THE GROWING INTEREST IN BRAZIL
A. Background
Despite their reputation for economic and political volatility, '7
emerging markets began to capture a larger share of global
investments in this decade. 8 The international community considers
economies such as Brazil's "as offering a wealth of opportunities in
trade, technology, transfers, and foreign direct investment." '9 The
head of the investment firm SBC Warburg, Eliazar de Carvalho Filho,
stated that "investment banks need to take a long-term view of Brazil.
Some may be discouraged by competition but the potential of the
market is huge." 20  In 1986, only $25 billion in private capital
investments went to emerging market economies. 2' By 1991,
however, 36% of all foreign funds earmarked for emerging markets
went to Latin America.22 By 1996 over $250 billion in private capital
was allocated to this market.23 Brazil especially benefited from this
growth in foreign investments, witnessing a 69% rise in the Bovespa,
the Brazilian equivalent to the Dow Jones Industrial Average, in the
first quarter of 1991.24 By 1997, foreign investments totaled 18% of
16. See infra notes 161-86 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Argentine Exchange On Top During First Quarter, THE WORLD BANK
WATCH, Apr. 22, 1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, ABBB File (stating that
Brazil's stock market lost 68% of its value in 1990, the second biggest drop in the world
that year).
18. See Emerging Markets Showed Biggest Gains in 1990, LDC DEBT REPORT/LATIN
AMERICAN MARKETS, June 3, 1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, ABBB File.
19. Sarkar, supra note 1, at 706.
20. Leslie Crawford, Mandates: Investing in the Future, FIN. TIMES (London), May
26, 1998, at 3, available in LEXIS, Market Library, PROMPT File.
21. See Hearings on Financial Crisis in Asia Before the House Banking and Financial
Services Committee, 105th Congress 165 (1998) [hereinafter Summers Statement]
(statement of Lawrence H. Summers, Treasury Deputy Secretary).
22. See Emerging Market Survey Finds Play Up in Latin Bourses, LDC DEBT
REPORT/LATIN AMERICAN MARKETS, Nov. 25, 1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, ABBB File.
23. See Summers Statement, supra note 21, at 165.
24. See Emerging Markets Showed Biggest Gains in 1990, supra note 18, at 1.
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Brazil's Gross Domestic Product, up from 15.5% in 1990.25 United
States banks were actively involved in this foreign capital infusion,
making a total of $27 billion in loans to Brazil by the end of March of
1998.26
What made Brazil attractive to foreign investors and banks was
the economic restructuring and stabilization plan that President
Fernando Cardoso introduced when he was appointed finance minister
in the mid-1990s. 27 Cardoso implemented anti-inflation measures and
continued privatization, which allowed foreign investors greater access
to large areas of the economy.28 Cardoso also began the Real Plan,29
linking Brazilian currency to the dollar.3" By keeping the exchange
rate high, Brazil signaled to the world that it had a robust economy. 3
The exchange rate program stabilized the Brazilian currency and
reduced inflation from 40% a month to only 1% for all of 1998.32
Despite potential problems with an overvalued currency, United States
banks expressed great confidence in the Brazilian market in this
decade.33 In addition to the stable currency, Brazil maintained
25. See Quarterly Report for BNDES Partners, BNDES NEWS (Aug./Sept. 1998)
(visited Oct. 9, 1998) < http://www.bndes.gov.br/english/>.
26. See Hearings Before the House Banking and Financial Services Committee, 105th
Congress 75 (1998) [hereinafter Chang Statement] (statement by Joyce Chang, Emerging
Markets Research, Merrill Lynch).
27. See Brazil's Steady Nerve, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1998, at 10, 10.
28. See id.
29. See Man of the Year, LATINFINANCE, July 1998, at 165, available in LEXIS,
News Library, ASAPH File. Cardoso's plan had three phases: fiscal reform; the
introduction of the Real Unit of Value (URV), designed to bring a complex system of
indexation in line with a single price adjustment mechanism; and the conversion of the
URV into a new currency called the real. See id. Prior to Cardoso's plan, Brazil had
been unable to make the reforms that other Latin American nations were making, and had
created a huge foreign debt. See David Mulford, Credit Suisse First Boston,
LATINFINANCE, July 1998, at 46, available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File.
30. See Mulford, supra note 29, at 46. One analyst called the real "the anchor for the
entire economic stabilization program." Chang Statement, supra note 26, at 75. In early
1999, Brazil abandoned the Real Plan in favor of a free-floating currency. See infra notes
94 - 105 and accompanying text.
31. See CNNfn, What's a Devalhation (Jan. 14, 1999) (visited Jan. 20, 1999)
< http://cnnfn.com/worldbiz/9901/14/devaluation.pkg/>.
32. See Ed Taylor & Diana I. Gregg, Brazil: Markets Transfixed by Brazil Fight to
Stabilize Currency, Stanch Capital Flight, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Jan. 20, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BNA1BF File.
33. See James R. Kraus, Brazil: A South American Giant Finds Its Footing, AM.
BANKER. March 27, 1997, at 9.
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sufficient foreign currency reserves to protect itself against panics.34
Once these reforms were in place, United States companies invested
more than $26 billion in that market. 35
Brazil is a commercial powerhouse in Latin America, with an
economy twice the size of both the Russian and Mexican economies.36
In 1997, Brazil's gross domestic product was almost $800 billion.37
Furthermore, with 160 million people, Brazil is the world's third most
populous democracy, providing a ready market for American
products.38 Brazilian imports of United States' goods and services run
at over $14 billion a year.39 One analyst noted that the Brazilian
market is used not only for sales but also as an export base for
American multinational companies, 80% of which are involved in
some form of business in the South American country.4" Sao Paolo,
the nation's largest city, is the focal point for most of these companies
since it is considered South America's business center." Because of
these developments, more United States' foreign investment currently
goes to Brazil than any other country in Latin America.42
34. See Peter Passell, Economic Scene; Private Capital is King in the New Order of
World Investment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at D2.
35. See Thomas Omestad, Will Brazil Produce the Samba Effect?, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Sept. 28, 1998, at 52, 52.
36. See id. Hugh M. Durden, president of Wachovia Corporation's corporate
banking division, stated that "historically there has been more volatility and less stability
in Brazil, but the fact remains that Brazil has the largest and most diverse economy in
Latin America." See Kraus, Brazil: A South American Giant Finds Its Footing, supra
note 33, at 9.
37. See id. In comparison, the total gross domestic product of Latin America and the
Caribbean Basin was about $1.5 trillion in 1994. See Why Free Trade in the Americas?
Wiy NAFTA?, Bus. AM., Aug. 1996, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAGS
File.
38. David Adams, Here's Why What Happens in Brazil Matters to U.S., ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 6, 1998, at 2A. Democracies make better markets for American
products because they are more open forms of government that provide opportunities for
corporations to establish a long-term trade relationship. See id.
39. See Brazil: Ex-IM Bank President Harmon Says Brazil Could Become Leading
Client, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 28, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BNAIBF File.
40. See Adams, supra note 38, at 2A (quoting Jerry Haar, director of the Inter-
American Business and Labor Program at the University of Miami's North-South Center).
41. See Sao Paulo: Brazil's Troubled Megalopolis, ECONOMIST, May 23, 1998, at 34,
34.
42. See id.
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B. Growing Interest of U.S. Firms
The positive outlook for growth of the Brazilian market in the
1990s drew the notice of both American corporations and their
bankers. 43 David L. Aaron noted that the Latin America countries are
"now the hot market for U.S companies.", 44  Notably, United States
export growth to the Latin American nations has grown by 150% since
1990.45  Large national banks such as Citicorp46 and BankBoston
Corp. (BankBoston) also expanded their operations in Brazil in the
mid-1990s. 47  By the end of 1997, BankBoston had more than $13
billion of assets in Latin America while Citicorp had $28 billion. 48 In
1998, BankBoston was the fifth largest mutual fund company in Brazil
with $6 billion in funds. 49 The cross-border lending exposure of the
seven large regional banks50 to Brazil was $5.1 billion in June of
1998. 5'
43. See Kraus, Brazil: A South American Giant Finds Its Footing, supra note 33, at 9.
44. See Aaron Sees Shift in Greatest Opportunities for U.S. Businesses to Western
Hemisphere, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, May 13, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BNAIBF File. David L. Aaron is the Commerce Undersecretary for
International Trade. See id.
45. See id.
46. See generally James R. Kraus, In a Shift, Citicorp Now Shopping Around for
Banks in Foreign Countries, AM. BANKER, May 1, 1997, at 10 (stating that the reason for
Citicorp's interest in foreign financial institutions is the range of possibilities with
emerging markets).
47. See id. Henrique de Campos Meirelles, the Brazilian-born president of
BankBoston, said that the reason the bank began to make ties with Latin America is
"because we have access to a growing economy, a growing money supply, and a growing
market share." James R. Kraus, Globetrotter, AM. BANKER, Dec. 18, 1997, at 18.
48. See James R. Kraus, BankBoston Charging Ahead in Latin America Despite
Crisis, AM. BANKER, Nov. 13, 1997, at 1.
49. See James R. Kraus, Banks Start Cutting Back Staff Abroad, AM. BANKER, Oct.
15, 1998, at 1.
50. See Tania Padgett, Investors Dump Big Banks on Brazil Devaluation Fears, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 28, 1998, at 28. The seven large regional banks include the old
BankAmerica Corp., BankBoston Corp., First Union Corp., formerly CoreStates
Financial Corp., Bank of New York Co., Republic New York Corp., and State Street
Corp. See id.
51. See id. This exposure includes "credit exposure on and off the balance sheet,
which includes loans, derivatives, and other securities." Id.
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C. Investment in Brazil by North Carolina-based Banks
Along with Citibank and BankBoston's corporate customers,
North Carolina businesses have increased their presence in Brazil in
the past decade.52 In response, North Carolina banks have become
increasingly involved in Brazil, either by assisting in loan packages,
opening branches, or purchasing banks. In December of 1997,
Wachovia Corp. (Wachovia) became the first North Carolina-based
bank, and the first bank in the United States, to acquire a Brazilian
bank, Banco Portugues de Atlantico-Brasil SA.53  The Brazilian
branch, Banco Wachovia, focuses on trade finance and service to
Wachovia's multinational corporate clients. 54  Hugh Durden, the
executive vice president and head of Wachovia Corporate Services
Inc., stated that Wachovia's corporate customers greatly needed
international services. 55 Durden emphasized that "Brazil has been one
of the top three markets for trade and investment activity [by
Wachovia clients] over the last several years, and this trend is
expected to continue." 
56
Following closely behind Wachovia, Charlotte-based
NationsBank Corp. (NationsBank), now known as BankAmerica after
its merger with California-based Bank of America, purchased a 51%
stake in Banco Liberal in January of 1998.17 The bank had already
opened a representative office in Sao Paolo, Brazil's capital, in July of
52. See Treasury Will Not Hold Tax Treaty Talks with Brazil Until Assurances are
Met, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 17, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BNAIBF File.
53. See In Brief. Wachovia Wraps up Brazilian Bank Deal, AM. BANKER, Dec. 18,
1997, at 9.
54. See id.
55. See James R. Kraus, Wachovia: Buying Brazil Banks, Concedes International
Service Is a Must, AM. BANKER, Jan. 9, 1997, at 8. Durden said "the trade finance
capabilities of Banco Wachovia, combined with Wachovia's enhanced global service
capabilities, will enable us to serve as a leading global financial services partner for
customers as they expand their multinational businesses in the Mercosul trade region."
Id. See also Wachovia Completes Acquisition of Brazilian Bank, PR NEwSWIRE, Dec. 5,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File. The countries of Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay make up the Mercosul free-trade region, representing 200
million people. See id.
56. See Kraus, Wachovia: Buying Brazil Banks, Concedes International Service Is a
Must, supra note 55, at 8.
57. See James R. Kraus, NationsBank Buys Into Brazil, Continuing U.S. Return to
Region, AM. BANKER, Jan. 28, 1998, at 1.
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1997.8 Banco Liberal serves as "a platform for further developing
activities" in a nation where many of its American clients are
expanding.59 A representative for the bank said that the purchase
"allows us to serve our U.S. clients more effectively, gives us a
foothold in an extremely active market, and allows us to participate in
an enormous number of privatizations expected to take place over the
next three to four years." 60 The bank is opening offices throughout
Brazil to build relationships with local enterprises in addition to
serving their current customers. 6' As of November 30, 1998, the total
exposure of BankAmerica to Brazil totaled over $3 billion. 62
First Union Corp. (First Union), also based in Charlotte, has
expanded its operations in Brazil. Most of its contact comes through
its Miami office, which serves as a "gateway to Latin America." 63
58. See Michael Kepp & James R. Kraus, NationsBank Widens Focus to Include Latin
America, AM. BANKER, Jul. 24, 1997, at 1. In 1998, NationsBank merged with
BankAmerica, which has $11.3 billion in cross-border lending exposure to Latin America.
See NationsBank and BankAmerica Qff Standard & Poor's Watch, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept.
23, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File.
59. See Kraus, NationsBank Buys Into Brazil, Continuing U.S. Return to Region,
supra note 57, at 1.
60. Id. About 30% of NationsBank corporate clients are involved in business in Latin
America, and about 300 of those clients are specifically involved in Brazil. See id.
61. See Kepp & Kraus, supra note 58, at 1. Robert D. Bailey, the senior
international banking executive for NationsBank, explained, "if you just stick to U.S.
businesses, you're not going to get any new business." Id. He estimated that
NationsBank had about 300 corporate clients who were considering broadening their
business in Brazil. See Kraus, Chase Buys an Investment Operation in Brazil, supra note
1, at4.
62. See BANKAMERICA CORP., QUARTERLY REPORT: SEC FORM 10-Q (Nov. 30,
1998), available in EDGAR (visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http://www.edgar-online.com/
brand/yahoo/search/?sym=bac>. BankAmerica's exposure to Latin America is sizable,
with over $42 billion at risk. See id. In comparison, BankAmerica's total exposure to all
of Asia is only $28 billion. See id.
63. First Union International Banking (1998) (visited Oct. 9, 1998) <http://www.
firstunion.com/international/advantage.html>. First Union's recent quarterly statement
notes the bank's modest exposure to international markets:
Further, a longstanding strategy that focuses on our middle-market
client base has enabled us to limit our credit exposures to areas of
recent public concern, such as emerging markets and hedge funds.
The greatest impact of the quarter's market movements was seen in
our commercial real estate loans held for securitization. If the financial
markets continue to be volatile, we would expect to be modestly
impacted in the future.
FIRST UNION CORP., QUARTERLY REPORT: SEC FORM 10-Q (Nov. 13, 1998), available in
EDGAR, (visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http://www.edgar-online.comlbrand/yahoo/search/
?sym=ftu>.
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Notably, the chair and chief executive of First Union, Ed Crutchfield,
suggested that the future of banking should include a "consolidation on
a worldwide scale by striking alliances and eventually merging with
foreign institutions." 64 First Union's Latin American expansion is
more moderate than BankAmerica or Wachovia with about $1.3
billion worth of approved trade credit lines to all of Latin America in
1997.65 One possible reason for this lesser degree of involvement is
that Banco Santander, a Spain-based bank heavily involved in Brazil,66
formerly owned a large share of First Union stock. In September of
1997, the bank sold all of its First Union common stock holdings. 67
Brazil's commitment to privatize state-owned businesses is
another reason that United States banks are involved in Brazil.68 Since
the early nineties, the Brazilian government has sold its majority stake
in many of its energy, utility, and transportation systems. 69  When
President Cardoso was first elected, he persisted in the privatization
plan that was underway before he came into office. 70 Now that he has
64. James R. Kraus, Citi Buying $22M-Asset Hungarian Bank; Deal Would Make It
8th Largest in Country, AM. BANKER, May 27, 1998, at 28.
65. See James R. Kraus, Regionals Flock to Miami with Eye on Latin Business, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 6, 1997, at 7.
66. See Transium First Union Bank (1998) (visited Oct. 20, 1998)
< http://secure.transium.com/background >.
67. See First Union International Banking (1998) (visited Oct. 9, 1998)
< http://www.firstunion.com/library/newpress/970919.html >.
68. See Brazil's Steady Nerve, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 1998, at 1, 1. State-owned
businesses that have been sold include railways, mining, electricity, telecoms, banks, and
ports. See id. Brazil's privatization program has increased foreign financing of the budget
deficit. See Susan Mclnerney & Diana I. Gregg, Brazil: More Self-Reliant Than the
Market Thinks, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT REPORT, Sept. 28, 1998, at 1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ABBB File.
69. See Brazil Turnaround Close, Salomon Assessment Says, LDC DEBT
REPORT/LATIN AMERICAN MARKETS, Jan. 20, 1991, at 7, available in LEXIS, News
Library, ABBB File. Privatization not only allowed foreign capital to flow into the
economy, it also increased the government's reserves. Investors are more willing to put
their capital into Brazil because of the reserves it holds. See Brazil: Banking Group Sees
Large Package for Brazil, Predicts Modest Recession, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY,
Oct. 1, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIBF File. Although Brazil's short-
term debt was approximately $50 billion as of mid-1998, it had about $50 billion in usable
reserves. See id. In contrast, Korea, another emerging economy, had $80 billion in debt
but only $6 billion in usable reserves. See id.
70. See Communications: Brazil Exceeds Expectations, Opens Up Huge Market With
$19 Billion Telebras Sale, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Aug. 5, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, BNAIBF File. The government's 51% share in the telephone
company sold for $19.01 billion, of which $13.3 billion came from foreign companies.
See id.
1999]
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been re-elected, continued privatization is virtually assured.7' In 1998,
foreign participation in privatization amounted to 35% of the total
proceeds.72 Banks can garner fees up to 1.5% of the total sale for
helping to arrange the loans for privatization.73 In the largest incident
of privatization yet, Morgan Stanley and Salomon Brothers collected a
fee between $20 and $40 million for assisting in the sale of Telebras, a
telecommunications company. 74
North Carolina banks are among those playing an important
role in privatization. In May of 1997, NationsBank assisted in the sale
of Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, a mining company, by financing a
loan worth over $1 billion. 75  NationsBank also financed the
privatization of Companhia Paulista de Forca e Luz, an electric utility
in the state of Sao Paolo.76 The $1.2 billion loan went to VBC
Energia, a Brazilian investment group.77 In addition, NationsBank
helped finance the privatization of the state-owned crude oil company,
Petrozuata, in a $1.45 billion deal.78 Both Wachovia and NationsBank
were joint arrangers in a loan for a cellular license bid made by
BellSouth and Banco Safra team in 1998. 79 Such privatizations are just
the beginning; Brazil has many more industries to auction off to the
highest bidder.8 ° Analysts also predict that investment bankers will be
needed to assist with the future consolidation of the privatized
companies that will create a new surge of mergers and acquisitions .8'
71. See Omestad, supra note 35, at 52.
72. See Telebras: World's Largest Privatization of All Time, BNDES NEWS, Aug.-
Sept. 1998, at 1.
73. See Crawford, supra note 20, at 3.
74. See id. Some analysts noted, however, that this sale was only 0.07% of the sale
profit, which was an unusually low fee for this type of transaction. See id. One reason
for the lower fees is that there is fierce competition to assist in privatization. See id.
75. See NationsBank Shows Advantages of Being a Big Bank, GAZETA MERCANTILE
ONLINE, May 26, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, GAZDLY File.
76. See Swafford, supra note 6, at 118.
77. See id.
78. See Deals of the Year, LATINFINANCE, July 1998, at 206, available in LEXIS,
News Library, ASAPH File.
79. See Loan of the Month, LATINFINANCE, June 1998, at 84, available in LEXIS,
News Library, ASAPH File. The total transaction was worth $1.75 billion. See id.
80. See Crawford, supra note 20, at 3. The Sao Paolo sewerage and water treatment
utility, Sabesp, is considered the next government-owned industry to be privatized. See
id.
81. See id.
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III. THE EFFECT OF THE GLOBAL CREDIT CRUNCH ON BRAZIL
The collapse of the Asian and Russian economies in 1998
brought stinging losses to United States banks that had invested
abroad."2 Rumors that Brazil planned to devalue the real as part of its
economic austerity program placed downward pressure on the stock
prices of major United States banks in the Fall of 1998.8'
Furthermore, Brazil increased its interest rates to avoid devaluation, 84
causing "market nervousness" about the overvaluation of the Brazilian
currency. 5 The previous rumors about devaluation became reality in
January of 1999, again implicating the stock prices of major United
States banks.8 6
Out of fears arising from this climate of risk, investors and
lenders retreated from emerging markets, creating the potential for a
global credit shortage.8 7 Because of worldwide economic difficulties,
United States banks became increasingly risk averse, cutting off the
flow of credit and loans extended to other emerging nations. 8 The
effects of this capital flight may be seen particularly in Brazil.89 In
August of 1998, the country experienced $12 billion in capital
82. See James R. Kraus, U.S. Bankers Say Emerging Nations Must Tighten Rules,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 6, 1998, at 1.
83. See Padgett, supra note 50, at 28.
84. See East Asian Economic Conditions: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong. 98 (1998) [hereinafter East Asian Economic
Hearings] (statement of Robert B. Zoelick, President and CEO-designate, Center for
Strategic and International Studies). The central bank of Brazil increased the annual prime
lending rate from 19.75% to 49.75% in September of 1998. See Brazilian Leader
Confident G-7 Will Offer IMF Resources, 71 Banking Rep. (BNA) 11 (Sept. 28, 1998).
85. East Asian Economic Hearings, supra note 84.
86. See Timothy L. O'Brien, The Markets: Stocks and Bonds; Despite Brief
Comeback, Bank Shares Continue to Slide, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at D3. See also
Stocks: Brazil Crisis Overshadows 4Q Reports, Sinking Bank Stocks for a Second Day,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 1999, at MI (BankAmerica, for example, lost almost $3 per share in
a single day of trading).
87. See Richard W. Stevenson, The Markets: Federal Reserve Lowers Key Rate by
Quarter-point, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at Al. Michael Moskow, president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, pointed out that investors mood for taking risks has
markedly declined. See id.
88. See id. See also Steven Mufson, Economic Crisis Adds New Fears, WASH. POST,
Oct. 5, 1998, at Al (describing commercial bankers' negative reactions to the economic
crisis). See generally Stevenson, supra note 87, at Al (describing the reasons the Federal
Reserve cut interest rates).
89. See Chang Statement, supra note 26, at 79. Between August and November of
1998, Brazil experienced more than $22 billion in foreign capital outflows. See id.
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outflows, followed by $10 billion more in just the first ten days of
September.90 By the end of the month, the Brazilian stock market had
dropped 15.82%. 9' Capital flight made it difficult for industries to
obtain financing, particularly since interest rates were soaring in Latin
America. 92  Investors also turned away from the Brazilian stock
market, creating an even greater need for foreign direct investment. 93
When the inevitable devaluation occurred in January of 1999,9'
Brazil finally succumbed to currency pressure and abandoned the Real
Plan. 95 Immediately after announcing the new monetary policy, Brazil
experienced major currency outflows, totaling about $3 billion in just
two days.9 6 In addition, the central bank's reserves fell to $40 billion
as the government attempted to stop a massive devaluation of the
real. 97  Initially, the government tried to direct a quite modest
devaluation but found that it could not effectively control the exchange
rate. 98 Brazil subsequently announced that it would permit the real to
90. See id.
91. See Diana Jean Schemo, The Markets: Stocks in Brazil Rally, Buoying Latin
Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at Cl.
92. See Sharon Harvey Rosenberg, South Florida Banks Tread Warily as Latin
America Reacts to Asia Crisis, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Sept. 22, 1998, at A2,
available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Fllaw File. See also Susan McInerney & Mark
Felsenthal, G-7- G-7 Support of Clinton Plan Nudges Investors Back to Emerging
Markets, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Nov. 3, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BNAIBF File (discussing attempts to ease interest rates in emerging markets).
93. See Laura Mandaro, Keen Interest, Fewer Opportunities and Financial Risk,
THOMSON'S INT'L BANKER, Oct. 12, 1998, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ABBB File.
94. See Taylor & Gregg, Brazil: Markets Transfixed by Brazil Fight to Stabilize
Currency, Stanch Capital Flight, supra note 32. Devaluation is defined as a considerable
decline in a currency's value when compared to either the value of gold or the value of
another country. See CNNfn, What's a Devaluation, supra note 31. A positive result of
devaluation is that it makes the country's products more competitive on the world market,
since they are less expensive. See id. Ideally, the country's economy will grow faster
because it will sell more of its goods on the market. See id. However, to investors,
devaluation signifies a weak currency, and therefore, a weak economy. See id.
95. See Taylor & Gregg, Brazil: Markets Transfixed by Brazil Fight to Stabilize
Currency, Stanch Capital Flight, supra note 32. See also supra notes 29-32 and
accompanying text (discussing the Real Plan).
96. See CNNfn, Real Floating Free of Band, (Jan. 15, 1999) (visited Jan. 20, 1999)
< http://cnnfn.com/markets/9901/15freal/ >.
97. See id. If the government's reserves continue to decline, the country could have a
difficult time meeting its debt obligations internationally. See CNNfn, Strong Gains on
Wall Street, (Jan. 15, 1999) (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://cnnfn.com/
marketsl9901l15lmarketwrapl>. This would jeopardize the IMF rescue package, since
paying interest on accrued debts is a condition of receiving the total amount. See id.
98. See Taylor & Gregg, Brazil: Markets Transfixed by Brazil Fight to Stabilize
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float freely, allowing the market to determine the exchange rate. 99
The complete abandonment of the anti-inflation plan was
caused by market pressures and growing fears of shrinking reserves.,O0
The central bank president, Francisco Lopes,' reasoned that the free
floating real allows for more flexibility for the financial market to fix
the exchange rate.'0 2 Upon news of the new monetary policy, stock
markets around the world began to recover from the losses caused by
the initial turmoil. 10 3 Brazilian investors were relieved to hear that the
government would no longer use their reserves to support the
weakened currency.°4 This relief was apparent when Brazilian stocks
increased 33.4% within two days after the devaluation
announcement. 105
While the devaluation may ease interest rates in Brazil, 10 6 it has
caused inflation to soar and could lead the nation into a recession.'0 7
Currency, Stanch Capital Flight, supra note 32.
99. See Stephen Fidler & Geoff Dyer, Brazil Moves to Limit Damage, FIN. TIMES
(N.Y.), Jan. 18, 1999, at 1. Because Brazil is allowing the real to float, it will not have
to use its reserves to buy reals and sell dollars in an effort to support its currency. See
CNNfn, Strong Gains on Wall Street, supra note 97.
100. See Geoff Dyer & Phillip Cogan, Brazil is Forced to Allow Float of Real, FIN.
TIMES (London), Jan. 16, 1999, at 1, available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, Fintme File.
Under Cardoso's plan, Brazil was using its currency reserves to maintain the value of the
real. See id. Investors reacted positively to the news that the government would no
longer use its reserves to defend the exchange rate. See id.
101. The Brazilian Senate elected Francisco Lopes on January 13, 1999. See Ed
Taylor, Brazil: Market Cheers as Brazil Removes Lopes from Bank Post, Puts in Soros
Fund's Fraga, BNA INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY, Feb. 4, 1999, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BNAIBF File. On January 29, 1999, Arminio Fraga, the former managing
director of the investment fund Soros Fund Management, subsequently replaced him. See
id.
102. See Ed Taylor & Diana Gregg, Brazil: Brazil Effectively Devalues Currency;
Action Creates Widespread Concerns, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Jan. 14, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIBF File.
103. See Dyer & Cogan, supra note 100.
104. See CNNfn, Real Relief for Latin Stocks, (Jan. 15, 1999) (visited Jan. 20, 1999)
<http://cnnfn.com/worldbiz/9901/15/americas/>.
105. See id.
106. See John Barham, Back to Reality in Sao Paulo, FIN. TIMES (N.Y.), Jan. 18,
1999, at 19.
107. See Geoff Dyer, Brazil Fights to Rebuild Credibility, FIN. TIMES (N.Y.), Jan. 18,
1999, at 4. See also Alan Beattie, All Eyes on Brazil, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 18,
1999, at 28, available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, Fintme File (stating that devaluation
threatens Argentine exports to Brazil since the real will lose its competitiveness); Taylor
& Gregg, Brazil: Brazil Effectively Devalues Currency; Action Creates Widespread
Concerns, supra note 102 (quoting Kurt Karl, head of Global Economic Services with
WEPA, Inc., who predicts a severe recession in Brazil as a result of the attempt to
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The biggest uncertainty is determining how much Brazil's economic
crisis will significantly impact the rest of Latin America, and possibly
the world. Economists fear that devaluation will materially effect the
nearby economies of Argentina and Mexico.'0 8 In the first week of
devaluation, Argentine banks raised their interest rates 50% due to the
increased cost of making loans.' 09 Since borrowers will not be able to
get as many dollars for their reals, they will have trouble repaying
their loans or making interest payments on securities." 0 In addition to
increasing Argentina's interest rates, the devaluation also threatens
Argentina's exports to Brazil, since inflation will increase the cost of
those exports." 1
The immediate impact of Brazil's devaluation decision on
American businesses was mixed." '  Some analysts believe that
Brazil's troubles will have a marked impact on the United States
economy because of the United States' major trade links with Brazil.'
If Brazil falls into a prolonged recession, United States companies may
be materially affected since 20% of Brazil's trade is with the United
States.' 4 Upon news of the Central Bank President's resignation and
the government's decision to devalue, banking companies substantially
stabilize their economy).
108. See Argentina: Argentine Banks Lift Rates 50% Following Brazil's Real
Devaluation, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Jan. 22, 1999, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BNAIBF File. See also Diana I. Gregg, Brazil: IDB Clears Record Loan for
Brazil as Cardoso Urges Emergency Fund, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Sept. 25,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIBF File (discussing economists fears of
devaluation's impact upon the Argentine and Mexican economies). Since Brazil is the
economic powerhouse of Latin America, the devaluation of the real would affect the
currency of neighboring countries, and spark capital flight from those countries. See
Diana I. Gregg, IMF: Camdessus Says IMF Moving Closer to Accord on Brazilian
Economic Package, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 9, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Library, BNAIBF File.
109. See Argentina: Argentine Banks Lift Rates 50% Following Brazil's Real
Devaluation, supra note 108.
110. See Padgett, supra note 50, at 28.
111. See Beattie, supra note 107, at 28. See also James R. Kraus, U.S. Banks Say
Brazil's Troubles Mean Opportunity, Not Losses, AM. BANKER, Jan. 19, 1999, at 33
(stating that Brazil receives one third of Argentina's exports).
112. See Karen Talley, Brazil Giving Banks in U.S. a Flashback to July Meltdown,
AM. BANKER, Jan. 14, 1999, at 1.
113. See Taylor & Gregg, Brazil: Brazil Effectively Devalues Currency; Action Creates
Widespread Concerns, supra note 102 (quoting Kurt Karl, head of Global Economic
Services with WEFA, Inc.).
114. See Adams, supra note 38, at 2A.
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involved in Latin America witnessed a decline in their stock price. 11
Both First Union Corp. and Wachovia have seen their shares decline
as investors shied away from international markets. 1 6  Furthermore,
the credit rating agency, Standard & Poor Corp. adjusted its rating to
"negative" for eight large banks that had significant ties to Brazil." 7
In addition, corporations who invested heavily in Brazil may see their
1999 earnings damaged by the devaluation. "s
In the worse case scenario, Brazil's currency could continue to
fall, causing severe inflation and triggering a painful recession. 9 The
Real Plan was an effort to reduce the high inflation Brazil experienced
in the 1980s and early 1990s." ° Abandoning the plan may result in a
real with anemic purchasing power.' A prolonged recession in
Brazil would negatively impact United States bank's earnings going
forward. 2 Furthermore, if interest rates decrease, foreign investors
who had been attracted by higher interest rates may abandon Brazil.
115. See Talley, Brazil Giving Banks in U.S. a Flashback to July Meltdown, supra note
112, at 1. Citigroup stock, for example, declined by $3.50 to $52.1875. See id.
BankBoston Corp.'s stock price, however, had risen by the end of the trading day after
the release of a positive statement to the public. See id.
116. See Karen Talley, Stocks: Brazil Crisis Overshadows 4Q Reports, Sinking Bank
Stocks for a Second Day, AM. BANKER, Jan. 15, 1999, at 1. An investment officer with
Grey, Siefert, however, noted that "this is the ideal environment for banks - no inflation,
decent earnings, and the economy is showing moderate growth." Id.
117. See Aaron Elstein, S&P Sees 'Negative' Outlook for 8 Big Banks with Substantial
Brazil and Latin Exposure, AM. BANKER, Jan. 15, 1999, at 24. The eight banks were
Citigroup, J.P. Morgan & Co., BankBoston Corp., ABN Amro NV, Dresdner Bank AG,
Societe Generale, Banco Santander (Spain), and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (Spain). See id.
Tanya Azarchs, a Standard & Poor's banking analyst, stated that Brazil's turmoil is
expected to impact many Latin American countries' economies. See id. Consequently,
Standard & Poor's also gave "negative" ratings to Mexico's two largest banks, Banamex-
Accival and Bancomer. See id.
118. See Brazil's Currency Moves to Affect First Quarter, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1999,
at B14. BellSouth Corp., an investor in wireless properties, issued a statement saying that
it anticipates its first quarter earnings to be negatively affected by the Brazilian
devaluation. See id.
119. See Taylor & Gregg, Brazil: Markets Transfixed by Brazil Fight to Stabilize
Currency, Stanch Capital Flight, supra note 32.
120. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
121. See CNNfn, Brazil's Real May Fall Further, (Jan. 22, 1999) (visited Jan. 22,
1999) <http://cnnfn.com/worldbiz/emergingmarkets/9901/22/brazil analysis!>.
122. See Chase Urges Quick Reforms in Brazil, AM. BANKER, Jan. 21, 1999, at 22
(citing commentary by sources at Chase Manhattan Corp.).
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IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT OF BRAZIL BY THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL COMMUNITY; THE PROPOSED IMF PLAN
A. Brazil's Need for Global Financial Support
The foregoing problems present a difficult case, at least in the
short term, for continued investment by United States banks in Brazil
and Latin America. Given the lending-related losses already incurred
and the growing instability in these emerging markets, banks are
reconsidering their involvement in this part of the hemisphere.'23
Understandably, banks and other financial institutions, held
continually accountable by shareholders, do not wish to underwrite the
risks associated with the increasing global contagion. Notwithstanding
the persuasive case for disengagement, particularly for United States
banks, several countervailing considerations counsel continued
engagement by the global financial community to help Brazil through
this difficult period.
First, in recent years United States companies, including
banks, have continually expressed confidence in the future of Brazil's
growth. 124 The underlying rationale for optimism in Brazil, at least
for the long term, is still valid. Some firms see the recent problems as
an opportunity, rather than as a harbinger of financial disaster. For
example, despite the January 1999 devaluation, the chairman and chief
executive officer of BellSouth stated that he was "convinced our Latin
American investments will continue to be a growth engine for us as we
enter the new millenium." 125 BankBoston reported that "we remain
confident in our near-term performance in Brazil, and our outlook for
the remainder of the year continues to be positive." 126 Banco
Santander, a Spain-based bank, indicated that it plans to continue to
123. See, e.g., Rick Brooks, BankAmerica Retreats from Overseas Markets, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 22, 1999, at A2. BankAmerica insiders reported that due to $433 million in
trading losses over the past two quarters, BankAmerica would be reducing its risk to
overseas markets in general. See id.
124. See supra notes 19-42 and accompanying text.
125. BellSouth Recognizes Brazilian Currency Devaluation, Remains Confident of
Growth Potential for Brazil and Latin America, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 20, 1999, at 7356,
available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File (quoting Duane Ackerman).
126. Kraus, U.S. Banks Say Brazil's Troubles Mean Opportunity, Not Losses, supra
note 111, at 33.
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expand its operations in Brazil." 7  In fact, some banks are
participating in large loans to Brazil, in order to prevent further
deterioration of the Brazilian economy.'28
Second, Brazil, like other fledgling capitalistic markets,
deserves support from its more experienced global partners, including
the United States. The recent IMF rescue plan, discussed below,
129
appears to have signaled the commitment of the global financial
community to Brazil and its continuing efforts of reform. As Joel L.
Naroff, chief bank economist at First Union stated, "sometimes you
have to take extraordinary measures to counteract what's
happening.... Sometimes you just have to take a stand." 130
Continued foreign direct investment is crucial for Brazil in light of its
experience with capital flight. 13' Given the presence of American
business interests in Brazil, 132 including North Carolina-based money-
center banks, 133 this endeavor is not just altruistic in nature.
Finally, foreign investors and lending institutions should draw
some assurances from the excess capital held by large Brazilian banks
that can be used to counteract the effects of devaluation. 134 Of the
largest banks, only Unibanco is highly leveraged. 135  Unibanco is
considered the weakest of the big banks because it depends more
heavily on foreign currency than the others. 136  Even this bank,
127. See Spanish Bank's Plans Unshaken by Brazil Woes, AM. BANKER, Jan. 21, 1999,
at 22. Banco Santander will merge with Banco Hispanoamericano. See id. The chief
executive officer of Santander Investment Securities, Inc., Ricardo Mandelbaum, believes
that Brazil's problems are merely short-term and will not inhibit future growth in Latin
America. See id.
128. See Gregg, Brazil: 1DB Clears Record Loan for Brazil as Cardoso Urges
Emergency Fund, supra note 108. James Wolfenson, president of the World Bank, told
the press that the bank will be taking part in a loan package for Brazil. See id. Banco
Santander, based in Spain, has hinted at its own aid package to Brazil. See Mandaro,
supra note 93, at 1.
129. See infra notes 138-60 and accompanying text.
130. Matthew Lubanko et al., Avoiding the Domino Effect; The Big Players in
International Finance Step In to Keep Brazil's Economy Afloat, HARTFORD COURANT,
Sept. 30, 1998, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Htcour File.
131. See Mandaro, supra note 93 (citing Gustavo Franco, Central Bank governor, at
the World Bank/IMF meetings).
132. See supra notes 17-51 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 52-81 and accompanying text.
134. See Barham, Back to Reality in Sao Paulo, supra note 106, at 19.
135. See id. Unibanco is Brazil's third largest bank. See id.
136. See John Barham, Brazilian Bank Raises Profit Despite Growing Volatility, FIN.
TIMES (London), Jan. 25, 1999, at 22, available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, Fintme File.
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however, is prepared to deal with devaluation since much of its loan
portfolio is made up of dollar-based trade finance operations.137
B. The Proposed IMF Plan
The hastily devised IMF rescue plan symbolizes the global
financial community's recognition of Brazil's importance to economies
worldwide. 138 The package includes almost $42 billion in aid, part of
which has already been made available to Brazil.'39 The IMF will
contribute $18 billion, the World Bank 140 and the Inter-American
Development Bank 14 1 will each contribute $4.5 billion, and twenty
other countries will together furnish $14.5 billion. 142 The United
States will contribute $5 billion of the latter amount. 14' The loan is
meant to "help slow capital flight from Brazil and prevent the current
global financial crisis from spreading into Latin America." '44
137. See id.
138. See Gregg, IMF: Camdessus Says IMF Moving Closer to Accord on Brazilian
Economic Package, supra note 108. The IMF is a Washington D.C.-based lending
institution composed of a 182-country member base which provides currency stabilization
for troubled economies through its lending program. See David E. Driscoll, What Is the
International Monetary Fund? (last modified Sept. 1998) <http://www.imf.org/external
/pubs/ftfexrp/what.htm >.
139. See Taylor & Gregg, Brazil: Brazil Effectively Devalues Currency; Action Creates
Widespread Concerns, supra note 102; David E. Sanger, Brazil Bailout: 2 Gambles for
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1998, at A4. The United States offered $5 billion for this
plan. See Taylor & Gregg, Brazil: Brazil Effectively Devalues Currency; Action Creates
Widespread Concerns, supra note 102.
140. The World Bank is similar to the I.M.F, but has a slightly different purpose. See
David E. Driscoll, The IMF and the World Bank, How Do They Differ? (last modified
Aug. 1998) <http://www.imf.orglexternal/pubs/ftlexrp/differ/differ.htm>. The World
Bank's sole purpose is "to promote economic and social progress in developing countries
by helping to raise productivity so that their people may live a better and fuller life." Id.
141. The Inter-American Development Bank conducts research and maintains records
on the economy of Latin American and Caribbean nations. See Inter-American
Development Bank (1999) (visited Jan. 7, 1999) <http://www.iadb.org/exr/ENGLISHI
RESEARCHDATA/researchdata.htm>. The bank also sponsors a lending program to
the nations of the region. See id. Founded in 1959, one of the IDB's policy initiatives is
the support of the economic integration of Latin American and the Caribbean. See id.
142. See Larry Rohter, IMF Announce a $41.5 Billion Rescue Package for Brazil,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1998, at A4.
143. See id.
144. James R. Kraus, IMF Says It Is Arranging Standby Credit for Brazil, with Bank
Participation, AM. BANKER, Oct. 9, 1998, at 20; Schemo, supra note 91, at C1.
Florencia Deteresa of Global Emerging Markets said, "currency outflows will come down
once it's sure that Brazilian foreign reserves will be backed by some kind of overdraft
protection from the IMF" Id.
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The IMF loan is contingent, however, upon having economic
reforms in place to strengthen and stabilize the economy.' 45 When a
reform plan was announced in the fall of 1998, both the IMF and
United States Treasury Secretary, Robert E. Rubin, expressed
confidence in its ability to bolster international support for Brazil.'46
Brazil's beginning steps toward implementing a plan was enough for
the IMF to declare trust in the country's commitment to reform. 4 7 In
November, Michael Camdessus, managing director of the IMF,
applauded Brazil for not delaying implementation of remedial
action. 148  Rubin concurred with Camdessus, emphasizing that the
package should restore investor confidence in Brazil, and that this
situation was "a totally noncomparable situation to Russia." 
149
The actions that Brazil must take in accordance with IMF
reforms include providing continuing disclosures to lending nations as
to Brazil's ongoing financial status.15 1 IMF loans also require
maintenance of open markets and avoidance of restrictions on trade
and government-directed lending or subsidies. 's' In addition, Brazil
must lower its budget by $20 billion this year. 152 If Brazil can make
the required reforms, it will be able to access the balance of the IMF
funds.15
3
President Cardoso, re-elected in October 1998, has remained
committed to stabilization, 154 and has pushed for compliance with IMF
conditions. 155  In late October of 1998, Cardoso announced an
145. Kraus, IMF Says It Is Arranging Standby Credit for Brazil, with Bank
Participation, supra note 144, at 20.
146. See Diana I. Gregg, Brazil: In Prelude to Aid Package, IMF, Rubin Welcome
Brazil Fiscal Stabilization Plan, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 30, 1998, available
in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIBF File.
147. See Diana I. Gregg, G-7: Crisis Not Over, But Easing, IMF Chief Says, Lauding
G-7 Policy, Latin American Resolve, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Nov. 10, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIBF File.
148. See id.
149. Paul Blustein, US, IMF Announce Plan to Avert Brazilian Crisis; Loan Package
Totals $41.5 Billion, WASH. PosT, Nov. 14, 1998, at A12.
150. See McInerney & Felsenthal, supra note 92.
151. See id.
152. See Taylor & Gregg, Brazil: Markets Transfixed by Brazil Fight to Stabilize
Currency, Stanch Capital Flight supra note 32.
153. See Sanger, supra note 139, at A4; Blustein, supra note 149, at A12.
154. See Man of the Year, supra note 29.
155. See Schemo, supra note 91, at Cl.
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austerity plan that includes tax increases and spending cuts that total
$23.5 billion for 1999.156 Long-term goals of the IMF plan announced
in November include decreasing the budget deficit to less than 5 % of
the gross domestic product"5 7 and bringing the federal budget into a
surplus. 15 8 Under the terms of the agreement with the IMF, Cardoso's
total spending cuts and tax increases will total $84 billion. 159
These reforms, however, cannot be expected to be
implemented overnight. Brazil faces a protracted recession, which
undoubtedly will be painful for its people. Consequently, Brazil's
decision-makers will face political pressure and will have to balance
IMF demands with concerns for domestic tranquility. 160 Accordingly,
the global financial community should be prepared for the delays and
frustrations that inevitably accompany such epochal reforms.
V. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The risks associated with lending in the emerging markets
raises questions about the supervision of United States banking
activities abroad. The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) has the principal
role of regulating both national and state-chartered member banks that
do business overseas.' 6 1 Initially, member banks must obtain FRB
approval in order to establish a branch in a foreign country. 16' Along
with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 16 and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),' 64 the FRB regulates
by investigating banks' methods of risk management in their lending
156. See Gregg, Brazil: In Prelude to Aid Package, IMF, Rubin Welcome Brazil Fiscal
Stabilization Plan, supra note 146.
157. See Ed Taylor, Brazil: Brazil's Draft Economic Stabilization Plan Draws
Immediate Criticism from Businesses, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Nov. 2, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIBF File. Critics say that the plan will weigh too
heavily on the private business sector, and does not concentrate enough on tax reform.
See id.
158. See Rohter, supra note 148, at A4.
159. See id. The spending cuts will reduce Brazil's new debt acquisition and the tax
increases will ensure that Brazil can meet its current debt payments. See id.
160. See Brazil on the Slide, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 1999, at 65.
161. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW & REGULATION
698-99 (2d ed. 1997).
162. See id. at 699.
163. See infra notes 165-170 and accompanying text.
164. See infra note 165.
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policies. 161 Much of the oversight involves making sure that banks
have risk management and evaluation procedures in place. 166
Since the 1960s, the OCC 167 has sent its regulatory inspectors
to the foreign branches of national banks for review.168  In 1977, it
began writing the Country Exposure Report, now fully adopted by all
three banking agencies under the direction of the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Committee.169  As a result of the debt crises
of the 1980s, the OCC strengthened its supervisory procedures for
United States banking activities abroad. 7 The enhanced oversight
and risk management procedures included an improvement in the
methodology of evaluating country risk, the requirement of disclosure
of all foreign banking activities, and the mandate of holding reserves
against loans to countries with poor debt repayment records. '7'
Furthermore, the OCC began to coordinate more fully with foreign
bank supervisors and the IMF.' 72
Concerns about lending practices to particular foreign
countries led Congress to pass the International Lending Supervision
Act of 1983 (ILSA). 173 The stated policy of ILSA is "to assure that
the economic health and stability of the United States and the other
nations of the world shall not be adversely affected or threatened in the
future by imprudent lending practices or inadequate supervision." 174
Federal agencies are required to establish supervisory procedures to
ensure that in the assessment of a bank's capital, such details as
165. See Note, The Policies Behind Lending Limits: An Argument for a Uniform
Country Exposure Ceiling, 99 HARV. L. REv. 430, 438 (1985).
166. See Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds," "General Custer," and the
Regulation of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 37 n.154
(1994).
167. See Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank
Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 501, 550 n.281 (1989). The
OCC has the responsibility of overseeing national banks and their subsidiaries; the FRB
and the FDIC have the responsibility of overseeing state-chartered banks. See id.
168. See Conover Statement, supra note 3; see also Hearings on the LDC Debt Crisis
before the House Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Congress 299
(1989) (statement of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency).
169. See Conover Statement, supra note 3, at 273.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 280.
172. See id.
173. See 12 U.S.C. § 3901-3912 (1994) (codifying ILSA).
174. Id. at § 3901.
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foreign country exposure and transfer risk are taken into account. 175
ILSA authorizes federal bank regulators to require that banks maintain
reserves if there is evidence that its borrowers may be unable to meet
their debt obligations. 176 Furthermore, ILSA provides that if a bank
charges a fee in excess of the administrative costs of restructuring the
loan, the bank must amortize the fee over the effective life of the
loan.' 77 Notably, ILSA does not establish specific limitations on
United States banks regarding the nature and extent of their activities
abroad. 178
The increasingly global nature of the banking industry and the
nature of its associated risks have prompted greater cooperation among
supervisory agencies worldwide. 179 To promote worldwide banking
standards, the Basel Committee developed Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervision, a set of 25 principles for securing an
operating supervisory system."'8 Such action was taken in response to
banking system deficiencies in the mid-1990s. ' Former Comptroller
of the Currency, Eugene Ludwig, also advocated the worldwide
adoption of the Basel Committee Core Principles, to lend consistency
to the market. 82 The OCC has allied itself fully with the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision,' 83 whose mandate includes
175. See id. § 3903(b).
176. See id. § 3904(a)(1)(A)-(B). See also Keith A. Palzer, Comment: Relational
Contract Theory and Sovereign Debt, 8 J. INT'L L. Bus. 727, 742-43 (1988) (discussing
the methods of the federal regulatory system).
177. See 12 U.S.C. § 3905(a)(1). The stated purpose of this section is to avert
excessive debt service burdens on the debtor country. See id.
178. See Note, The Policies Behind Lending Limits: An Argument for a Uniform
Country Exposure Ceiling, 99 HARV. L. REV. 430, 440 n.39 (1985) (describing the
limited functions of ILSA).
179. See Remarks by Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, before the
Institute of International Bankers, on International Banking, Washington, D.C., March 2,
1998, 17-2 0CC Q.J. 51 (1998) [hereinafter Ludwig Statement].
180. See Hearing on Current and Future Bank Examination and Supervision Systems
before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the U.S. House
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Congress 92, 105 (1997) [hereinafter
Hearing on Future Bank Supervision] (statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of
the Currency).
181. See id.
182. See Ludwig Statement, supra note 179, at 51.
183. See Kristin Leigh Case, The Daiwa Wake-Up Call: The Need for International
Standards for Banking Supervision, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 215, 221 (1996)
(discussing the benefits of having a coordinated international system of banking
supervision). In 1974, the Basel Committee was created by the Group of Ten countries.
The Basel Committee is made up of supervisors from twelve countries and seeks to
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strengthening the quality of supervision of bank's foreign activities
through strict disclosure requirements, improved oversight procedures,
and prescribed risk management standards. '84
In 1998, the Asian and Russian crises awakened the United
States banking industry to the potential risks arising from international
banking.185  These crises have highlighted the need for greater
disclosure of information and the need for international standards of
banking supervision. "' While federal agencies can do their part by
regulating the foreign activities of United States banks, the cooperation
of all nations in constructing global safety and soundness mechanisms
is needed in order to avert future bouts of global financial instability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Involvement in an emerging market is a risky endeavor for the
American business community, but is also one with potentially sizable
returns. Businesses are crossing over into a relatively uncharted
territory when they invest in an emerging market. Unlike the United
States, these markets often have weak economies because they lack the
necessary infrastructure to sustain volatile market pressures. The
recent injection of foreign capital into such markets, however, may
help to strengthen these infrastructures, so long as the accompanying
debt burdens do not become too weighty. The United States has a
vested interest in helping to create economically strong neighbors who
can maintain a strong trade relationship.
Banks should consider the consequences of drastically reducing
their investments in Brazil and other emerging economies. Despite the
fears of inflation and massive capital flight, many analysts are
optimistic about the long-term growth of Brazil. 187 The effects of
standardize banking laws between those countries by providing policy guidance. See id
The countries included in the committee are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. See Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services under GATS, NAFTA
and the EC: A Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 43 n.7
(1995) (describing the functions of the Basel Committee).
184. See Hearing on Future Bank Supervision, supra note 180, at 105.
185. See Ludwig Statement, supra note 179, at 51.
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., Richard Waters, How Immune is Wall Street, FIN. TIMEs (London),
Jan. 15, 1999, at 17, available in LEXIS, Market Library, PROPT File (stating that Wall
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devaluation, though severe, may be the necessary medicine to cure the
country's economic woes.'88 The world should take notice that Brazil
has demonstrated its continued commitment to economic stabilization
and reform. The IMF loan and the reforms that are conditioned upon
it indicate that, despite the turbulence from the blustery winds of
global financial markets contagion, there is hope for a stable economic
future for Brazil and other emerging economies.
RACHEL V. STEINWENDER
Street analysts believe Brazil is different from other emerging nations and will be able to
limit the negative impact of devaluation).
188. See Diana I. Gregg, Brazil: IMF Pleased With Brazilian Meeting, Emphasizing
Keeping Lid on Inflation, BNA INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY, Jan. 20, 1999, available in
LEXIS, News Library, BNAIBF File. The IMF and the World Bank expressed their
support for the government's decision to float the real. See id. The anti-inflation program
depleted the country's reserves to dangerously low levels. See id.
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